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Department of Economics Investment in Cellulosic Biofuel Reﬁneries: Does the Waivable Mandate Matter?
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) in the U.S. 
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) man-
dates U.S. consumption of 16 billion gallons of cellu-
losic biofuel by 2022, starting at 0.1 billion gallons in 
2010 (Figure 1). However, due to uncompetitive costs, 
as of February 2010 no commercial scale cellulosic 
biofuel refinery is operating (Renewable Fuels Associa-
tion, 2/25/10).
Tradable Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) is 
the market mechanism by which the mandates are to 
be met. But the RFS allows for a waiver of the man-
dates. Our study shows that under certain conditions, 
even a waivable mandate can stimulate investments in 
cellulosic biofuel refineries. A waivable mandate always 
increases the expected profit of low cost refineries. 
In a two-period world, potential investors in the cellu-
losic biofuels industry have the same fixed cost, f, but 
different marginal cost, c. Figure 2 shows an investor’s 
decision tree.
The respective discounted profits from investing (I) or 
not investing (NI) in period one are:
  
Here β is discount factor; p1 and p2 are the prices of 
cellulosic biofuel in periods one and two, respectively; 
pRIN is the price of RINs in period two. The distribu-
tion of p2 is J(p2). Define ∆(c) ≡ B(I )– B(NI). Let c* 
denote the marginal cost of investors who are indiffer-
ent between I or NI in period one. Hence ∆(c*) = 0. 
We show that c* = p1 – (1– β) f.
Baseline Scenario: Laissez-faire






Finding 1. If almost surely every realization of p2 
is sufficiently high, then RINs will not affect the 
first period investment level. 
Waivable-Mandate Scenario
In this scenario pRIN can be expressed as:
Where G(•) is the distribution function of c, X1 is 
the realized aggregate capacity in period one, M 
is the mandate level in period two. We show that 
c* in this setting is also implicitly determined by 
(1) above, implying :
Finding 2. The period-one investment level in the 
waivable-mandate scenario is the same as in the base-
line scenario if the marginal cost of each refinery is 
constant.
Waivable Mandate Increase the 
Expected Proﬁt of Low Cost 
Reﬁneries
Suppose one state of p2 is pl under which pRIN > 0. 
In the baseline scenario, the aggregate operating 
profit of running plants is area A in Figure 3. 
In the waivable-mandate scenario, however, every 
available plant will be kept running with revenue 
fixed at c*.  For plants with c ≤  pl and plants with 
c ∈ (pl, c*), the increased profit by the policy is area 
B and C, respectively, implying:
1. RINs will not affect the first period investment 
level if: a) almost surely every realization of p2 is 
sufficiently high; or b) the marginal cost of each re-
finery is constant.
2. A waivable mandate increases, at least weakly, 
the expected profit of investors who invest in the 
first period. 
3. If investors' marginal costs are strictly increasing, 
then a waivable mandate can stimulate the period-
one investment level. 
4. To precisely measure the investment impact of 
the waivable mandate policy, empirical research on 
estimating the price distribution and the cost func-
tions is needed.
Figure 2. An Investor’s Decision Tree






max[p2+pRIN – c – f,0]
Figure 3. Profit Effect on RIN Policy 
when p2 = pl
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Figure 1. Mandates for Cellulosic Biofuel in 
EISA (2007)


























Figure 4. Profit Effect under Increasing 
Marginal Cost
Finding 3. Relative to laissez-faire, low cost cellu-
losic biofuel firms expect to profit from a waivable 
mandate.
Increasing Marginal Costs
In this case, RINs will drive cellulosic biofuel price 
to a level higher than the shut-down price to keep a 
plant running at its full capacity. This makes invest-
ing in period one more preferable. Figure 4 depicts 
this effect. Hence:
Finding 4. When investors’ marginal cost is in-
creasing, then even a waivable mandate has a posi-
tive effect on investment level in period one. 
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